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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY’S
LEVIATHAN
AMY KAPCZYNSKI*
Neoliberalism is a complex, multifaceted concept. As such, it offers many
possible points of entry into my primary field of study, that of intellectual
property (IP) law. We might begin by investigating tensions between IP law and
1
a purely economic conception of neoliberalism, for example. Or we might
consider whether or how IP law might be “insulated from democratic
2
governance” while also being rapidly assembled. In these few pages, I want to
focus instead on a different line of inquiry, one that reveals the powerful grip
that one particular neoliberal conception has on our contemporary imaginary:
the neoliberal conception of the state. Today, both those who defend robust
private IP law and their most prominent critics, I will show, typically describe
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1. Neoliberalism is commonly understood in economic terms. See, e.g., David Singh Grewal &
Jedediah Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2014 at 1.
David Harvey has argued, however, that neoliberalism as “a political project to re-establish the
conditions for capital accumulation and to restore the power of economic elites” tends to prevail over
the “economic utopian” conception of neoliberalism. DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF
NEOLIBERALISM 19 (2007). Though I will not explore the issue here, this seems to be particularly
powerfully exemplified in the IP field. There are serious tensions between conceptions of “free
markets” and “free trade” and the muscular, transnational regime of exclusion rights in information
that we have today. IP rights can be readily conceived of not as property, but as regulation, and their
insertion into international law not as a move toward free trade, but instead as the result of
protectionism and rent-seeking. The law as it is, and the common defense of that law as serving
economic interests, may thus be more the result of political ordering than of any purely economic logic.
2. Grewal and Purdy associate neoliberalism with a political intervention that operates to “settle
the terms of accommodation between the market and broadly democratic politics,” in particular by
“defining and regulating market relations in ways that insulate them from democratic governance.”
Grewal & Purdy, Introduction: Law and Neoliberalism, supra note 1, at 14. But IP law is very much
under construction, raising a puzzle about how IP law might be made but at the same time shielded
from democratic claims-making. One way that this may occur is through the internationalization of IP
law. Historical accounts show that the Clinton Administration, for example, deliberately sought to
insert provisions into international treaties that it failed to move through Congress. See Pamela
Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 369, 428–30 (1997). The United States
Trade Representative (USTR) also presses aggressive interpretations of U.S. law in new international
instruments, which constrain the policy space available to the United States as well foreign
counterparts. In the process, the USTR also regularly keeps draft agreements secret from the public,
while sharing them with a privileged group of industry advisors. See Margot E. Kaminski, The Capture
of International Intellectual Property Law Through the U.S. Trade Regime, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 977
(2014).
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the state in its first instance as inertial, heavy, bureaucratic, ill-informed, and
perilously corruptible and corrupt.
This depiction of the state as a neoliberal Leviathan has become
commonsensical. I will not here attempt to defend an alternative account of the
modern state, but I do want to suggest grounds to suspect that this neoliberal
image does not serve us well. For example, as I will show, neither side in the
current debates over IP sustains an image of the state as irredeemably
neoliberal because a capable, flexible, and responsive state is essential to each
side’s competing vision of the good life. Insofar as our theories require a decent
state, it seems important to be able to describe one and to offer an account of
the conditions that might sustain it. Moreover, there is some evidence in the
domain of information policy that the modern state can be capable and
efficacious, as well as open to democratic claims-making.
In the domain of IP scholarship, and undoubtedly also beyond, we need a
serious, curious engagement with the state of the modern state. That
engagement ought not ignore evidence that the modern state is vulnerable to
ineptitude, and can be commandeered to achieve undemocratic aims. It should
insist, instead, that we better understand the conditions in which this is more or
less likely to be true. Ultimately, the field of IP law needs a postneoliberal
imaginary of the state, not because we are sure that we can bring such a state
about but because we cannot bring it about if we assume it away.
I
The dominant contemporary justification for IP law turns critically on a
particular conception of the modern state—a conception that is easily
recognizable as neoliberal. Today, IP law is primarily analyzed and justified in
welfarist terms, and more particularly through the lens of economics, with
3
efficiency posited as the primary goal. This account begins by characterizing
information as typically expensive to produce but cheap to reproduce. Absent
property rights, then, it is said to be difficult to recoup investments in the
creation of information in competitive markets. For example, without patents,
pharmaceutical companies that spent millions on research and development
would be immediately undercut by generic competitors. Without copyrights,
Hollywood studios would ostensibly face the same problem. When more finely
tuned, this account recognizes that, even in competitive markets, companies
may have some ways to recoup their investments in information in the absence
of IP rights. For example, innovative companies may enjoy critical lead time
over copiers and, in some industries, secrecy is still possible. But such
alternative means are described as both diminishing in our networked digital
age and as insufficient to generate the degree of investment in information that
3. See, e.g., ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 11 (6th ed. 2012) (“Utilitarian theory, and the
economic framework build upon it, has long provided the dominant paradigm for analyzing and
justifying the various forms of intellectual property protection.”).
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is socially desirable. Absent a state-created right to exclude, the traditional
account suggests that markets will invest too little in information. IP laws thus
are intended to provide incentives to innovate by allowing those who create
informational goods to recoup their investment in the marketplace.
This describes one half of the so-called “public-goods problem” of
information: In the absence of state-backed property rights, it is difficult for
someone who has invested in information production to exclude others from its
4
benefits. The second component of the public-goods problem makes the story
more complicated still: information is understood as not only “nonexcludable,”
but also as “nonrivalrous,” because it can be shared without being depleted.
Information is not like pizza. If you and I both want a slice of pizza, a slice must
be produced for each of us. In a competitive market, the price of a slice will be
the marginal cost of producing the additional slice. If you and I both want to
sing a song, or make use of a mathematical formula, or deploy a basic public
health precept (wash your hands!), we can do that without the other having less
of it, or without an additional “unit” of that information having to be produced.
Information thus has a marginal cost of zero, which in economic parlance means
that for efficient uptake, it should be priced only at its cost of distribution.
Private intellectual property, however, is designed to render information
excludable and to increase its price beyond marginal cost so that innovators can
recoup their investments. In economic terms, this supramarginal cost pricing is
expected to generate static and dynamic inefficiencies (absent perfect price
discrimination, which is costly, difficult, and not expected in practice). Some
people are willing to pay $2 but not $10 for the new Beyoncé album; others are
willing (or able) to pay only $100 for a textbook priced at $200. If people are
excluded from the good, their lost consumer surplus is counted as deadweight
loss. Dynamic inefficiencies are associated with exclusion rights, too, because
information is an input and output of its own production and because “there is
no guarantee that the research effort will be delegated efficiently to the most
5
efficient [developers].” For this reason, many leading economists—including,
most famously, Nobel Prize winner Kenneth Arrow—have suggested that the
most efficient means to promote information production involves not exclusion
6
rights but public procurement.
The lynchpin of the dominant justification for IP law, it turns out, is
4. See Peter S. Menell & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property Law, in HANDBOOK OF LAW
ECONOMICS 1473, 1477 (A. Mitchell Polinksy & Steven Shavell eds., 2007). It is not obvious that
material goods are in fact so distinct from information in this regard, because they may also be difficult
to exclude without sanctions backed by a state or other social authority. The idea that information is
unusual in this regard relies upon a peculiar hypostatization of the law and norms that support private
property in material goods.
5. Id.
6. Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 623
(Richard R. Nelson ed., 1962) (stating that “for optimal allocation to invention it would be necessary
for the government or some other agency not governed by profit-and-loss criteria to finance research
and invention”).
AND
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therefore an argument not about property but about the modern state. The
leading IP-law casebook summarizes it this way:
Numerous institutional mechanisms exist for addressing the public goods problem
inherent in the production of ideas and information—direct government funding of
research, government research subsidies, promotion of joint ventures, and prizes. The
case for intellectual property rights ideally compares all of these options. Intellectual
property rights have the advantage of limiting the government’s role in allocating
resources to a finite set of decentralized decisions: whether particular inventions are
worthy of a fixed period of protection. The market then serves as the principal engine
of progress. Decentralized consumers generate demand for products and competing
decentralized sellers produce them. By contrast, most other incentive systems,
7
especially large-scale research funding, require central planning on a mass scale.

William Landes and Richard Posner put the point similarly; government
prizes or rewards should be avoided because they “would be hopelessly
8
politicized, with grossly debilitating effects on economic efficiency.”
In this account, then, the state is not absent but called forth in a very
particular image. It is expected to effectively generate the conditions of privatemarket ordering, in particular by creating private property rights in information
and by facilitating their enforcement. But the state is also characterized as
incapable of effectively engaging more directly in the organization of
information production. Why would the state be well-suited to the crafting of
property rights, but ill-suited to directing innovation policy in other ways? On
this point, the conventional theory is often vague but implicitly invokes a
9
Hayekian hypothesis about information asymmetries. On this account, the state
is unlikely to have sufficient information to determine what goods ought to be
created. But when creating property rights, the state need not know what kinds
of goods should be created; rather, it need only create generally applicable
10
rights and then allow market actors to decide how to allocate investment. As
the Landes and Posner quote suggests, the state here is also imagined to be
uniquely vulnerable to capture, a problem that is described as more acute when
the state is directly doling out rewards than it is when the state is merely
establishing general rules of conduct.
This image of the state is easily recognized: it is the state as it is described in
neoliberal discourse. As David Harvey has written, in the “first instance,”
The role of the state [in neoliberal theory] is to create and preserve an institutional
framework appropriate to [neoliberal] practices. . . . State interventions in markets
(once created) must be kept to a bare minimum because, according to the theory, the
state cannot possibly possess enough information to second-guess market signals
(prices) and because powerful interest groups will inevitably distort and bias state
7. MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 3, at 18. As this paragraph also illustrates, the
dominant justification for IP law does not consider nonmarket, nongovernment alternatives for
information production, such as the commons-based strategies discussed below.
8. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 9 (2003).
9. See F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 521 (1945).
10. For the canonical description of this particular virtue of IP, written as a rejoinder to Arrow’s
famous account of the need for state investment in information production, see Harold Demsetz,
Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1969).
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11

II
Over the last decade or so, a powerful set of critiques has emerged to
contest the dominant account just sketched out as well as the contemporary
12
state of IP law. These arguments have come from many directions, some even
13
arising from scholars who previously were champions of the dominant account.
The most prominent and potent line of theoretical critique in the legal literature
has come in the guise of arguments for free culture and the “information
commons” and has been most influentially articulated by Lawrence Lessig and
14
Yochai Benkler. Both have stressed the problems with expansive exclusiverights regimes in information and have also sketched a set of actually existing
alternatives to market-based exclusionary forms of information and cultural
production.
Lessig has written a series of influential books that have made him a “rock
15
star of the information age,” particularly for young Internet and free-culture
activists. He has argued powerfully, for example, that existing copyright law is
in deep conflict with the radical new possibilities for creativity in the digital age.
As he points out, when a mother posting a video of her toddler dancing to a
Prince song on YouTube is threatened with a $150,000 fine for copyright
16
infringement, something has gone seriously awry. Lessig also contends that
copyright law today is too long, too expansive, and instantiates a “permission
17
culture” that is antithetical to free expression in the age of the remix. As he
puts it, “the Internet has unleashed an extraordinary possibility for many to
participate in the process of building and cultivating a culture that reaches far
11. HARVEY, supra note 1, at 2.
12. See generally Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics of
Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804 (2008) (discussing the political and social factors culminating in
the access to knowledge movement and some of the ideas of that movement); see generally ACCESS TO
KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (Gaëlle Krikorian & Amy Kapczynski eds.,
2010) (collecting multiple pieces on this movement).
13. Most notable here is Richard Posner’s recent suggestion that “both patent and copyright
protection, though particularly the former, may be excessive.” Richard Posner, Do Patent and
Copyright Law Restrict Competition and Creativity Excessively? Posner, THE BECKER-POSNER BLOG
(Sept. 30, 2012), http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/2012/09/do-patent-and-copyright-law-restrictcompetition-and-creativity-excessively-posner.html.
14. See, e.g., YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS: HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM (2006); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG
MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY
(2004).
15. So named by no less an authority than The Economist. Free Mickey Mouse, ECONOMIST (Oct.
10, 2002), http://www.economist.com/node/1378700 (“Law professors rarely boast an army of ‘fans,’ but
Lawrence Lessig is no run-of-the-mill academic. Now at Stanford University, formerly at Harvard, Mr.
Lessig has become a rock star of the information age, mixing scholarly inquiry with barnstorming
activism on many issues.”).
16. See Lawrence Lessig, In Defense of Piracy, WALL. ST. J. (Oct. 11, 2008),
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB122367645363324303 (discussing the “Let’s Go Crazy” lawsuit).
17. For a discussion of the conflict between free and permission culture, see LESSIG, supra note 14,
at 192–93.
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beyond local boundaries,” creating the possibility of markets that “include a
much wider and more diverse range of creators,” if not stifled by incumbents
18
who use IP law to “protect themselves against this competition.”
Benkler’s work has also been extraordinarily formative in the field,
particularly for his insights into the multiplicity of modes of information
production. As he has stressed, the conventional justification for IP does not
account for the many successful and longstanding modes of market
19
nonexclusionary information production. For example, attorneys write articles
to attract clients, software developers sell services customizing free and opensource software for individual clients, and bands give music away for free to
20
increase revenues from touring or merchandise. More pathbreaking still is
Benkler’s account of the importance of “commons-based peer production,” a
form of socially motivated and cooperative production exemplified by the
volunteer network that maintains Wikipedia or the groups of coders who create
21
open-source software products such as the Linux operating system. In the
digital networked age, as Benkler describes, the tools of information production
are very broadly distributed, “creating new opportunities for how we make and
22
exchange information, knowledge, and culture.” These changes have increased
the relative role in our information economy of nonproprietary production and
facilitate “new forms of production [that] are based neither in the state nor in
23
the market.” Because commons-based peer production is not hierarchically
organized and is motivated by social dynamics and concerns, it also offers new
possibilities for human development, human freedom, a more critical approach
24
to culture, and more democratic forms of political participation.
This line of critique has been profoundly generative and has helped launch
an important new conceptualization of the commons as a paradigm. That
paradigm, as a recent book puts it, “helps us ‘get outside’ of the dominant
discourse of the market economy and helps us represent different, more
25
wholesome ways of being.” Proponents of the commons concept draw upon
contemporary articulations of successful commons-based resource management
26
by Elinor Ostrom and her followers. They do mobilize retellings of the
political and economic history of the commons in land in Europe before
18. Id. at 9.
19. See BENKLER, supra note 14, at 41–49.
20. Id. at 43.
21. Id. at 60.
22. Id. at 2.
23. Yochai Benkler, The Idea of Access to Knowledge and the Information Commons: Long-Term
Trends and Basic Elements, in ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN THE AGE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
supra note 12, at 217, 229.
24. Id.
25. David Bollier & Silke Helfrich, Introduction: The Commons as a Transformative Vision, in
THE WEALTH OF THE COMMONS: A WORLD BEYOND MARKET AND STATE xi, xvii (David Bollier &
Silke Helfrich eds., 2012).
26. See, e.g., ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).
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27

enclosure, and recent evidence from psychology and behavioral economics
that suggests that humans have deep tendencies toward cooperation and
28
reciprocation. They argue that
A key revelation of the commons way of thinking is that we humans are not in fact
isolated, atomistic individuals. We are not amoebas with no human agency except
hedonistic “utility preferences” expressed in the marketplace. No: We are
commoners—creative, distinctive individuals inscribed within larger wholes. We may
have unattractive human traits fueled by individual fears and ego, but we are also
creatures entirely capable of self-organization and cooperation; with a concern for
fairness and 29social justice; and willing to make sacrifices for the larger good and future
generations.

This stands, of course, as a powerful rebuke to the neoliberal imaginary,
which “constructs and interpellates individuals as . . . rational, calculating
creatures whose moral autonomy is measured by their capacity for ‘self-care’—
30
the ability to provide for their own needs and service their own ambitions.”
III
Given this radical—and, in my view, critically important—attempt to
rethink the subject at the core of neoliberal accounts, it is all the more striking
that proponents of the commons often appear to adopt a neoliberal image of
the state. For example, the introduction to a recently edited volume that gathers
writings on the commons from seventy-three authors in thirty countries
(entitled, tellingly, The Wealth of the Commons: A World Beyond Market and
State) has this to say:
The presumption that the state can and will intervene to represent the interests of
citizens is no longer credible. Unable to govern for the long term, captured by
commercial interests and hobbled by stodgy bureaucratic structures in an age of
nimble electronic networks, the state is arguably incapable of meeting the needs of
31
citizens as a whole.

The commons, they suggest, is a concept that seeks not only to liberate us
from predatory and dysfunctional markets, but also from predatory and
dysfunctional states. Something immediately seems incongruous here. If people
are inherently cooperative reciprocators, why are states irredeemably corrupt?
After all, as Harold Demsetz famously wrote in his 1967 attack on Arrow’s
optimism about state production of information, “[g]overnment is a group of
32
people.”
Lessig, one of the progenitors of the language of the commons in the
informational domain, often leads with a similar view of the state:
27. See, e.g., PETER LINEBAUGH, THE MAGNA CARTA MANIFESTO (2008).
28. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE PENGUIN AND THE LEVIATHAN: HOW COOPERATION
TRIUMPHS OVER SELF-INTEREST (2011); SAMUEL BOWLES & HERBERT GINTIS, A COOPERATIVE
SPECIES: HUMAN RECIPROCITY AND ITS EVOLUTION (2011).
29. Bollier & Helfrich, supra note 25, at xv.
30. WENDY BROWN, Neoliberalism and the End of Liberal Democracy, in EDGEWORK: CRITICAL
ESSAYS ON KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 37, 42 (2005).
31. Bollier & Helfrich, supra note 25, at xiv.
32. Demsetz, supra note 10, at 9.
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[I]f the twentieth century taught us one lesson, it is the dominance of private over
state ordering. Markets work better than Tammany Hall in deciding who should get
what, when. Or as Nobel Prize-winning economist Ronald Coase put it, whatever
problems there are with the market, the problems with government are more
33
profound.

Lessig reveals his own sense of the power of this conception of the state
when he seeks to tar IP law with the same brush; we should rebel against
current IP law, he suggests, because we should “limit the government’s role in
34
choosing the future of creativity.”
Benkler is more measured but admits as well to viewing the state as “a
35
relatively suspect actor.” We should worry, he suggests, that direct
governmental intervention “leads to centralization in the hands of government
36
agencies and powerful political lobbies,” a view that echoes the neoliberal
account described above.
It should perhaps not surprise us that leading critics of neoliberal
information policy embrace a neoliberal conception of the state. After all,
neoliberalism is not merely an ideology, but also a set of policy prescriptions
that may have helped to call forth the state that it has described. As David
Harvey puts it, “[t]he neoliberal fear that special-interest groups would pervert
and subvert the state is nowhere better realized than in Washington, where
armies of corporate lobbyists . . . effectively dictate legislation to match their
37
special interests.”
There are, it must be said, few areas of law that better exemplify this
problem than IP law. For example, Jessica Litman has documented the
astonishing process through which the 1976 Copyright Act was drafted, in which
Congress delegated most of the drafting to interest groups that were forced to
38
negotiate with one another. Other scholars have offered similarly startling
accounts of the genesis of the most important IP treaty today, the TradeRelated Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement. TRIPS
33. LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED
WORLD 12 (2001).
34. Bollier & Helfrich, supra note 25, at xvi.
35. BENKLER, supra note 14, at 21.
36. Yochai Benkler, The Commons as a Neglected Factor of Information Policy (Oct. 3, 1998)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.benkler.org/commons.pdf.
37. HARVEY, supra note 1, at 77. This may be so, though I am not committed to that view because
it depends upon a historical claim about the virtues of the pre-1970s state that is, at the very least,
contestable. For a recent historical account of the intertwining of the early administrative state in the
United States with profit motivations, see NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE:
THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780–1940 (2013).
38. See Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV.
857, 860–62 (1987). As she describes:
Members of Congress . . . encouraged, cajoled, bullied, and threatened the parties through
continuing negotiations. They mediated disputes and demanded that combative interests seek
common ground. Viable compromises emerged from the interminable negotiations largely
because of congressional midwifery. The incessant pressure to achieve agreement among
industry representatives was deliberate and planned in advance.
Id. at 871–72.
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came into force in 1996, revolutionizing international IP law by both imposing
new standards and by rendering them enforceable through the WTO’s disputeresolution system, which authorizes trade retaliation to enforce its judgments.
Most countries in the world are members of TRIPS, and the Agreement
introduced, for developing countries in particular, substantial new obligations,
such as the obligation to grant patents on medicines and food-related
inventions. Several excellent histories of the treaty have been written,
documenting its beginnings as a brash idea proposed by “twelve chief executive
officers (representing pharmaceutical, entertainment, and software
39
industries).” As Susan Sell has described, the TRIPS Agreement was a
triumph of industry organizing. Through TRIPS,
Industry revealed its power to identify and define a trade problem, devise a solution,
and reduce it to a concrete proposal that could be sold to governments. These private
sector actors succeeded in getting most of what they wanted
from a global IP
40
agreement, which now has the status of public international law.

These histories have made the neoliberal discourse of state “capture”
41
irresistible in this field of law, perhaps moreso even than in other fields.
Yet it is also the case that, as regards intellectual property law and
information policy, the modern state has not revealed itself only to be captured
by interest groups. The most striking recent example came in the 2012 campaign
against a proposed new law called the “Protect-IP Act.” That campaign
emerged swiftly, instigated by nonprofit groups and netizens, and managed in a
few short weeks to derail a bill that had already passed through Committee and
that was seen as a fait accompli because it was strongly backed by Hollywood
42
and other powerful industry groups. Another recent example comes from the
transnational campaign against the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, a
campaign that very significantly shaped the Agreement’s provisions and
ultimately led the treaty to be rejected by one of its main proponents, the
43
European Union. Activists have also moved beyond a defensive agenda,
39. SUSAN SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 1 (2003). For another important account of the formation of TRIPS, see PETER
DRAHOS WITH JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE
ECONOMY? (2002).
40. SELL, supra note 39, at 2.
41. See, e.g., Kaminski, supra note 2, at 8–25; LANDES & POSNER, supra note 8, at 14; Timothy
Wu, Copyright’s Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278, 291–92 (2004).
42. See generally, EDWARD LEE, THE FIGHT FOR THE FUTURE: HOW PEOPLE DEFEATED
HOLLYWOOD AND SAVED THE INTERNET—FOR NOW (2013); Yochai Benkler et al., Social
Mobilization and the Networked Public Sphere: Mapping the SOPA-PIPA Debate, BERKMAN CTR. FOR
INTERNET
&
SOC’Y
(July
25,
2013),
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/publications/2013/
social_mobilization_and_the_networked_public_sphere (mapping the online media discourse
surrounding the proposed legislation); Susan K. Sell, Revenge of the “Nerds”: Collective Action Against
Intellectual Property Maximalism in the Global Information Age, 15 INT’L STUD. REV. 67 (2013).
43. See EU Officially Pronounces ACTA Dead As Commission Withdraws Court Of Justice
Assessment, TECHDIRT (Dec. 12, 2012, 12:02 AM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20121219/
15502521443/eu-officially-pronounces-acta-dead-as-commission-withdraws-court-justiceassessment.shtml. For an earlier example of successful mobilization against expansionist IP treaties, see
Samuelson, supra note 2, at 374.
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successfully pushing the World Intellectual Property Organization to pass the
Marrakesh Treaty, the first-ever treaty dedicated to defining mandatory
exceptions and limitations to IP law, thereby promoting access to copyrighted
44
works for the visually impaired.
The point is not to recommend optimism about the power of democratic
engagement on questions of information policy or to suggest that the extensive
evidence of industry influence in this domain has been wrongly construed.
Rather, it is to suggest that we miss something if we characterize the modern
state as only corrupt and vulnerable to capture. If we can see people as having
both “unattractive human traits fueled by individual fears and ego,” and as
“capable of self-organization and cooperation” as well as capable of “a concern
45
for fairness and social justice,” what prevents us from seeing the state in the
same way?
Indeed, for both proponents and critics of restrictive private IP law, the
capable state is an indispensable concept. Both groups implicitly demand—and
imagine—states that are not corrupt, ponderous, and ill-informed, but rather
that are responsive, dynamic, and knowledgeable. Under the dominant
justification for IP law, as described above, the state must be capable of
generating well-crafted private-property law. That account tends to figure such
law as simple to craft and as relatively immune to the dynamics of capture
because of its generally applicable nature. But it is far from clear that IP law
today resembles this image. Statutory exclusion-rights regimes can be
enormously complex and include myriad provisions that are designed to affect
only particular industries, as the U.S. Copyright Act well displays. That Act has
been revised dozens of times and runs upwards of 100,000 words. The copyright
that it defines is not one right, but an amalgam of many rights—for example
rights of reproduction, adaptation, distribution, and (for certain categories of
46
works) display and public performance. New categories of works have been
added over time, extending copyright protections to entirely new domains such
47
as architectural works and sound recordings. Extraordinarily specialized
exceptions also have been codified, which often bear the obvious imprint of
48
particular corporate interests. There is nothing simple or prepackaged about
the shape of copyright protection.
Even patent law, which better fits the model of abstract and generally-

44. See Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind,
Visually Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION,
(July 31, 2013), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/vip_dc/vip_dc_8_rev.pdf.
45. Bollier & Helfrich, supra note 25, at xv.
46. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
47. 17 U.S.C. § 102. Sound recordings were added to the Act in 1971, see Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85
Stat. 391 (Oct. 15, 1971). Architectural works were added in the 1990 Act. See Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104
Stat. 5089, 5133.
48. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 111 (“Limitations on exclusive rights: Secondary transmissions of
broadcast programming by cable”); 17 U.S.C. § 122 (“Limitations on exclusive rights: Secondary
transmissions of local television programming by satellite”).
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applicable law, must be interpreted and applied to particular industries and
49
applicants. In the first instance, this is done by patent offices, which are
50
frequently described as dangerously susceptible to industry influence.
Companies can—and sometimes successfully do—also lobby for very discrete
51
benefits, such as the extension of individual patent terms. The crafting of IP
law is an irredeemably complex enterprise. Legislatures must prescribe the
scope of available subject matter, standards of novelty or originality, the
duration of terms, the nature of exceptions and limitations, and so forth.
Although competing interest groups may be balanced by legislative processes
that pit them against one another, the history of IP law also shows that
legislatures have innumerable ways to carve out concessions to particular
groups.
In fact, there is no cause for a rigid distinction between “property” and
“regulation” in this domain. Some might see in this evidence that IP law should
be cleansed of any particularized elements in order to diminish the opportunity
for capture. But if IP law is to have any claim to efficiency, to the contrary, it
must be tailored to particular contexts. After all, the costs of innovation, as well
as of transactions around exclusion rights, may vary enormously across
52
industries. Even the most ardent proponents of restrictive private property
rights in information concede that such rights must, to meet any plausible
definition of efficiency, also be limited in certain ways and must be
supplemented by government-funded research. Consider, for example, this
statement by Richard Epstein:
[N]o defender of intellectual property thinks that private ownership of all valuable
ideas is a smart social move. Rather, just as the air and waters are often held in
common, the initial premise of intellectual property is that basic ideas (including
various scientific laws) are property in the public domain for the best of functional
reasons. The creation of private rights in these intellectual objects will blockade
all
53
sorts of useful works without creating much of an incentive for their creation.
54

Epstein has also criticized recent copyright-term extensions, thereby calling
49. See Dan K. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology Specific?, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1155, 1156 (2002) (“As a practical matter, it appears that while patent law is technologyneutral in theory, it is technology-specific in application.”).
50. See F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Preferring Patent-Validity Litigation over Second-Window
Review and Gold-Plated Patents: When One Size Doesn’t Fit All, How Could Two Do the Trick?, 157 U.
PA. L. REV. 1937, 1949–50 (2009); Mike Masnick, Revolving Door Between Gov’t And Industry
Continues: Pharma Lawyer Goes To USPTO As Gov't Financial Regulator Goes To Wall St.,
TECHDIRT (Feb. 22, 2011, 10:12 PM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110221/23203913198/
revolving-door-between-govt-industry-continues-pharma-lawyer-goes-to-uspto-as-govt-financialregulator-goes-to-wall-st.shtml.
51. See Robert Patrick Merges & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, The Proper Scope of the Copyright and
Patent Power, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 45, 53 (2000).
52. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1581–
95 (2003).
53. Richard A. Epstein, Why Libertarians Shouldn't Be (Too) Skeptical About Intellectual
Property, 13.4 PROGRESS & FREEDOM FOUND., PROGRESS ON POINT 1, 7 (Feb. 13, 2006),
http://www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/pop13.4epsteinip.pdf.
54. Id. at 11.
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attention to another issue: excessive IP law is clearly expected to generate
inefficiency, and incumbent industries are likely to have a strong interest in
advocating for more restrictive IP law.
As Landes and Posner recognize, conventional understandings of
information economics demand not only that the state fund so-called “basic
research,” because such research “has no near-term commercial application and
55
so could not be financed by patenting.” In fact, the role of the state in the
efficient production of information is logically still far larger. As Talha Syed and
I have shown, patent rights do not offer symmetrical powers of exclusion over
different kinds of information goods. In the presence of patents, drugs are
56
easier to exclude than are new exercise regimes, for example. A patent system
operating alone would misallocate resources toward more excludable forms of
research. An efficient system requires government not just to fund basic
research, but also to fund research that is highly nonexcludable, whether it is
basic or applied.
Consequently, those who defend a robust private-property approach to
information production typically also imagine a state that plays an active and
interventionist role in the information economy. Such a state must carefully
configure IP law in all of its profuse contingencies, lest it create legions of
individuals and firms capable of projecting power in ways that stifle rather than
promote innovation. It must respond quickly and deftly to the emergence of
new technologies; it must grant and enforce IP rights reliably and without
prejudice; it must override exclusion rights when market failures appear; and it
must supplement private intellectual property with government procurement
strategies when needed. To do all of this, the state must of course also be able
to determine the impact of changes to IP law and ascertain where market
failure is likely, both enormously information-intensive activities.
Critics of robust exclusion rights in information also envision a muscular
role for the state. This is sometimes not obvious because of the capacious way
that such scholars employ the concept of the commons. For example, Lessig and
Benkler have both described public roads as critical aspects of contemporary
57
infrastructure and also as exemplars of the commons. There is something odd
about grouping public roads with Wikipedia and open-source software. Unlike
these archetypal examples of the information commons, roads are funded by
the state, governed by the state, and policed by the state. They are not created
or maintained in any significant way through voluntary networks or
58
decentralized social motivation. Benkler also analogizes basic science to
55. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 8, at 307.
56. Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits of Patents, 122
YALE L.J. 1900, 1936–37 (2013).
57. LESSIG, supra note 33, at 20; Yochai Benkler, Commons and Growth: The Essential Role of
Open Commons in Market Economies, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1499, 1499–50 (2013).
58. Benkler recognizes this, but still concludes that we should consider public roads to be a
commons. Benkler, supra note 57, at 1549. This flows from his definition of the commons as resources
“over which no one exerts exclusionary proprietary claims and that are available for all to use on
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commons-based peer production. The analogy between science and Wikipedia
is a more comfortable one because, as Benkler notes, “[s]cience is built by many
people contributing incrementally—not operating on market signals, not being
handed their research marching orders by their dean—but independently
60
deciding what to research, [and] bringing their collaboration together . . . .”
But modern science is also a massive state-funded enterprise. The National
Institutes of Health, for example, allocate thirty billion dollars each year for
61
health research. Although that research is largely allocated by scientific
62
decisionmaking, channeled through grant proposals and peer review, this
process does not negate the role of the state in providing funds and establishing
the institutions that facilitate peer review. The expansive deployment of the
concept of the commons itself may be a symptom of the power of the neoliberal
image of the state in our contemporary imaginary. Pessimism about the state
may be so profound that we become inclined to submerge its role, even when it
clearly stands behind programs and functions that we demand and need.
Like proponents of exclusion rights in information, advocates of the
commons also at times expressly make demands upon the state in ways that
seem incompatible with the radical pessimism about the state that they often
lead with. For example, commons theorists call upon the state to “begin to
provide formal charters and legal doctrines to recognize the collective interests
63
and rights of commoners.” This is the commons-based equivalent of asking the
state to involve itself only in the production of private property regimes.
Although it is less clear what kinds of moves these commons advocates might
be asking of the state, it seems likely that they will require the same
informational sophistication and openness to democratic claims-making that
would be required for sound lawmaking in the domain of private intellectual
property.
Lessig also calls for a series of ambitious reforms that states ought to
undertake, including not just major scaling back of copyright law, but also the
64
affirmative “building out [of] the information superhighway.” Benkler also
suggests that his Wealth of Networks offers “no reason to think that, for
example, education should stop being primarily a state-funded, public activity
and a core responsibility of the liberal state, or that public health should not be
65
so.” If the state is to play this role and play it well, however, it will require
symmetric terms.” Id. at 1499.
59. Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards a Political Economy of Information, 52
DUKE L.J. 1245, 1256 (2003).
60. Id.
61. See About NIH: NIH Budget, NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, http://www.nih.gov/
about/budget.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2014) (reporting a budget of $30.1 billion in financial year 2014).
62. See generally Bhaven N. Sampat, Mission-Oriented Biomedical Research at the NIH, 41 RES.
POL’Y 1729 (2012).
63. Bollier & Helfrich, supra note 25, at xviii.
64. See LESSIG, supra note 33, at 244. Benkler does the same. See Benkler, supra note 36, at 7.
65. BENKLER, supra note 14, at 22. Benkler also affirms the role of “state funding for basic science
and research.” Id.
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substantial support—particularly because of the overtly distributional
component of these public functions. It will also require efforts to critically
reimagine the role of the state in an age of both neoliberalism and of commonsbased peer production.
IV
The capable state is a concept that we seem to be unable to live without,
though this is admittedly not the same thing as showing that such a state does or
could exist. There are, however, empirical reasons to resist the notion that the
state is incapable of playing a major and positive role in information policy, and
not just because the state must be involved in any such scheme, including that of
creating exclusion rights. Might it be that the modern state is in fact better at
directly promoting innovation than it is at creating private property rights that
are well-configured do the same? After all, the same state that gave us the
“Mickey Mouse” Copyright Term Extension Act, which lengthened copyright
protection by two decades, not only prospectively but also retroactively (to
better incentivize Walt Disney, God rest his soul?), has also funded agencies
like the National Institutes of Health, the National Science Foundation, and
(more ominously), Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, which are
widely credited with the foundational advances that made the networked
66
information age and the biotech age possible. Governments today fund not
only blue sky research, but also “mission-oriented research,” with particular
goals in fields like health and energy, where their role is critical not because
possible applications are distant in time, but because their social value is hard to
internalize even in the presence of private intellectual property rights, or
67
because the private sector is more risk-averse than is government.
It is in some sense no surprise that all of this is not well-profiled in recent
debates about information policy and private IP law, particularly in the United
States. After all, as Erik Reinart has recently put it:
[S]ince its founding fathers, the United States has always been torn between two
traditions, the activist policies of Alexander Hamilton (1755-1804), and Thomas
Jefferson’s (1743-1826) maxim that ‘the government that governs least, governs
best.’ . . . With time and usual American pragmatism, this rivalry has been resolved by
putting68the Jeffersonians in charge of the rhetoric and the Hamiltonians in charge of
policy.

This pragmatic accommodation may have a dangerous aspect, if it intersects
with neoliberal trends in a way that brings about a state that is less empowered
and less worthy of our respect. It would not be surprising if there were a selffulfilling dimension to the neoliberal image of the state. If common wisdom
suggests that the state is an inertial Leviathan, will the best young minds want to
66. See MARIANA MAZZUCATO, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE: DEBUNKING PUBLIC VS.
PRIVATE SECTOR MYTHS (2013).
67. MAZZUCATO, supra note 66, at 108.
68. ERIC REINERT, HOW RICH COUNTRIES GOT RICH AND WHY POOR COUNTRIES STAY POOR
23 (2007).
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labor in its service? And if skepticism about the abilities of the state leads us to
relegate it largely to facilitating the functions of the market, would it be a
surprise if this new state were more susceptible to capture?
In these few pages I can do no more than generate some doubt about the
neoliberal image of the state that enjoys such currency in contemporary IP
literature and beyond. But I hope I have done that. What is needed in IP
scholarship—as elsewhere in legal studies—is a postneoliberal conception of the
state, but one that is attuned to the fact that some aspects of the contemporary
state in fact resemble the nightmarish neoliberal image. A call to bring the state
back in is not a call to dislodge the generative new work being done on the
commons, but rather to suggest that there is today no viable form of a
prepolitical commons, and that theorists of the commons need to make space in
both their accounts of the commons, and in their articulations of the political
domain that they wish to bring into being, for a postneoliberal image of the
state. Can we conceive of—even if we cannot easily achieve—a state that is
capable of constraining the proliferation of exclusion rights in information and
that can support social ordering beyond markets? Is it possible to imagine a
state that could temper the tendencies of certain market formations to promote
ghastly inequality, environmental collapse, and political corruption of the first
70
rank? If the answer is no, then we should fear grievously for our collective
future. In that case, the market and the commons will not be able to save us
from the neoliberal Leviathan, and the future of ideas will be bleak indeed.

69. MAZZUCATO, supra note 66, at 4.
70. For a call along similar lines, see Michael Bauwens & Franco Iacomella, Peer-to-Peer
Economy and New Civilization Centered Around the Sustenance of the Commons, in THE WEALTH OF
THE COMMONS, supra note 25, at 326.

